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Article 12(3) CRPD requires states parties to provide access by persons with disabilities
to the support they may require in exercising their legal capacity. This is to ensure that
the rights, will and preferences of persons with disabilities are enjoyed on an equal
basis with others [Articles 12(1)(2) and (4) CRPD]. Moreover, the Committee on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities has made it clear that supported decision-making
must replace substitute decision-making arrangements as these are discriminatory and
deny equal enjoyment of the right to exercise of legal capacity for persons. At the same
time, there is ongoing debate as to whether or not the absence of substitute decision-
making regimes is essential for the non-discriminatory realization of an individual’s rights,
will and preferences to be achieved. To resolve this debate, however, specific attention
needs to be paid to the CRPD message on what it actually means to give effect to the
equal and non-discriminatory enjoyment of rights for all. In the context of persons with
mental disabilities this requires looking beyond human rights simply in terms of limiting
unwarranted interventions to the proactive removal of obstacles to full rights enjoyment
and the creation of environments that respect and support such enjoyment. With this
in mind this paper will therefore critically consider the use of supported decision-making
within existing substitute decision-making regimes with particular reference to Scotland’s
mental health and capacity laws. It will consider the challenges this poses and whether it
is indeed possible to adapt existing regimes to achieve CRPD compliance. In doing so, it
is suggested that a full appreciation of the overarching CRPDmessage about equality and
non-discrimination in the enjoyment of rights is required to bring about such compliance.
Keywords: mental health law, mental capacity law, CRPD, supported decision-making, Scotland, paradigm shift
INTRODUCTION
As is the case for many jurisdictions Scotland is wrestling with the issue of giving meaningful effect
to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), particularly its Article 12,
and the extent to which this is possible. Indeed, whilst some of the conceptual and practical aspects
of giving effect to Article 12 are unique to Scotland many other conceptual, and some practical,
aspects are common to most states. A consideration of these issues are therefore of value to those
seeking to bring about CRPD related change in Scotland and also in other jurisdictions.
Article 12(2) CRPD requires that “States Parties shall recognize that persons with disabilities
enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life.” In interpreting this right
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the Committee on the Right of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD
Committee) General Comment No. 1 makes a distinction
between “legal capacity” and “mental capacity” (1). Having legal
capacity is the ability to, for example, make contracts, refuse
medical treatment and marry. It is the ability to both be a rights
holder and to exercise those rights and allows a person’s views—
their will and preferences—to be given effect and respected.
Mental capacity, on the other hand, is a person’s decision-
making skills and which may vary from time to time and
between individuals.
The CRPD Committee emphasizes that exercising legal
capacity is something all human beings must enjoy on an equal
basis with each other and is fundamental to the enjoyment
of all other rights (1). It points out that actual or perceived
difficulties with decision-making—often associated with persons
withmental disabilities—are often used to justify the denial of the
exercise of legal capacity and that this is discriminatory because
decision-making difficulties can be overcome with support. This
support includes supported decision-making to ensure that a
person’s will and preferences are discerned and given effect. The
CRPD Committee states that appropriate supported decision-
makingwill normally be able to assist a person to identify and give
effect to their will and preferences. However, it also acknowledges
the rare occasions where, despite significant efforts being made,
it is not possible to ascertain these then a best interpretation
of such will and preferences can be made (1). The Committee’s
reasoning here is that diagnosis and mental capacity assessments
are generally used as thresholds for substitute decisions being
made for the individual but that these are often influenced by
subjective, and often misconstrued, assessments of what is in that
individual’s “best interests” which results in discrimination (1).
Moreover, the whole purpose of supported decision-making is to
assist and enable decision-making capacity rather than diagnosis
and capacity thresholds being used to deny such enablement.
It is clear that the Article 12 CRPD objectives are unlikely to
be achieved through mental health and capacity laws that give
ultimate precedence to clinical or other professional judgment
over the will and preferences of persons with mental disabilities.
However, this has led to a divergence of often strongly held
opinions on how the objectives of Article 12 CRPD can
be achieved.
It has been suggested that Article 12 CRPD compliance can be
achieved within substitute decision-making arrangements (such
as compulsory psychiatric treatment laws and guardianship)
provided they are underpinned by human rights-based principles
that include a presumption in favor of an individual’s will
and preferences and clearly delineate the need for, and role
of, supported decision-making (2, 3). The CRPD Committee’s
General Comment No.1, on the other hand, is unequivocal in
stating that substitute decision-making regimes and supported
decision-making arrangements are incompatible if genuine effect
is to be given to the rights, will and preferences of persons
with mental disabilities (1). This CRPD Committee stance
has received some resistance, largely by clinicians, who have
expressed concerns that such an approach has the potential to
deny beneficial treatment and put the individual and public at
risk (4, 5). However, compelling arguments exist that it is indeed
possible for supported decision-making to coercive psychiatric
treatment and this will better ensure that basic needs, including
the right to the highest attainable standard of health, are properly
meet and dignity respected (6, 7).
Arguments also exist that capacity-based mental health laws
not only guarantee beneficial treatment where required and
safety but also ensure parity of esteem in terms of treatment
of persons with physical and mental health conditions (8–11).
This viewpoint appears to be relatively popular given that several
states in recently reforming their mental health and capacity laws
have either retained, or introduced, capacity or capacity-type
thresholds for non-consensual interventions (12) [for example,
Victoria’s (Australia) Mental Health Act 2014 and the Mental
Capacity Act (Northern Ireland) 2016].
However, the best approach to navigating the impasse
undoubtedly lies in locating supported decision-making within
fundamental CRPD message of equal and non-discriminatory
enjoyment of rights. In the context of persons with mental
disabilities this requires looking beyond human rights simply
in terms of limiting unwarranted interventions to the proactive
removal of obstacles to full rights enjoyment and the creation
of environments that respect and support such enjoyment (13–
15). With this in mind this article will therefore now consider
the role of supported decision-making in the context of Scotland
which is currently undergoing a review of its mental health and




tHE terms “supported decision-making,” “support for decision-
making,” and “support for the exercise of legal capacity”
are increasingly, and often interchangeably, referred to in
literature, policy and practice in connection with pursuing CRPD
compliance for persons with mental disabilities. However, from
even a cursory view it is not always clear precisely what these
terms are supposed to achieve. Used in conjunction with most
existing substitute decision-making arrangements in the context
of “supported decision-making” and “support for decision-
making” might arguably be said to support an individual to
participate in but not necessarily to direct decisions made that
concern them. Although the CRPD Committee has also referred
to “supported decision-making” when interpreting support for
the exercise or legal capacity in Article 12 CRPD (1) it is
apparent that in CRPD terms the purpose of “supported decision-
making” or “support for the exercise of legal capacity” means
something else.
1The ScottishMental Health LawReviewwebsite, including its Terms of Reference,
can be found at https://www.mentalhealthlawreview.scot/ The author is a member
of the Review’s Executive Team. The opinions expressed in this article are not,
however, necessarily those of the Review Executive Team or it’s Chair, John Scott
QC, but of the author alone.
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Equal and Non-discriminatory Enjoyment
of Human Rights—A New Approach and
CRPD Myth Busting
As already stated, the CRPD is clear that persons with disabilities
must, in general, be able to enjoy all human rights on an
equal basis with others and without discrimination and, where
necessary, to be supported to achieve this.2 This also applies to
the exercise of legal capacity.3 In General Comment No. 1 the
CRPD Committee explains that support to achieve this equal
and non-discriminatory exercise of legal capacity must possess
certain essential characteristics. In order to ensure that primacy is
given to the person’s rights, will and preferences on the same basis
as others the support may take many different forms and must
be tailored to an individual’s decision- making support needs,
its substance and uptake must be in the person with disability’s
discretion and it’s availability must not be conditional on
mental capacity assessments (1). In essence therefore, supported
decision-making as envisaged by the CRPD seeks to place those
who face decision-making challenges in the same position as
those who do not experience such challenges.
The CRPD reinforcement of the principle of equal and non-
discriminatory rights enjoyment goes beyond that identified in
previous international human rights instruments. Traditional
understandings of this principle have tended to permit
differential treatment provided that it can be objectively and
reasonably justified (16–19) which invariably has been the
case for persons with physical and mental disabilities (1, 20).
The CRPD message is essentially that if real equal rights
enjoyment is to be achieved then it is necessary to start
with a level playing field: persons with physical and mental
disabilities who may experience greater practical, institutional
and societal challenges with enjoyment of such rights must
be supported—whether by, for example, supported decision-
making,4 reasonable accommodation,5 or universal design6—
to achieve this on an equal basis with other (20). Only when
this level playing field has been reached can the restriction
of rights, applying the same criteria for all, be considered (1,
20). To start from a position where certain persons are not
entitled to full enjoyment of rights because they possess a certain
characteristic – in the case of persons with persons with mental
disabilities owing to others’ perceptions of their capabilities –
results in structural inequalities, and thus discrimination, from
the outset (1, 20). Somewhat akin to Sen and Nussbaum’s
capability approach, rights must be viewed not primarily in terms
of defining the extent to which they may be limited. They must
instead be viewed from the perspective of ensuring that all are
able to enjoy a fulfilled life which includes protection from abuse
and discrimination (for example, in the context of care and
treatment) and appropriate support and services to allow for full
and effective inclusion, participation, recovery and rehabilitation




5Articles 2 and 5 CRPD.
6Articles 2 and 4 CRPD.
policy and practice frameworks if there is to be parity of rights
enjoyment between persons with mental disabilities and others
in respect of enjoyment of all rights and aspects of life (13,
14). However, a full understanding of this approach to equality
and non-discrimination is required if states are to successfully
navigate the challenges presented by the CRPD Committee’s
radical assertion that supported decision-making must replace
substitute decision-making (15).
Articles 12(3) and 12(4) CRPD collectively identify
appropriately tailored supported decision-making as an
important safeguard to the equal exercise of legal capacity.
Amongst other things, Article 12(4) provides—and this is
reinforced by the CRPD Committee’s General Comments
Nos 1 and 6 (1, 20)—that such safeguards must ensure
respect for “the rights, will and preferences of the person”
and be “free of conflict of interest and undue influence.” In
essence, this means ensuring that an individual’s authentic
choices are given effect in the same way as others’ choices
are. At this juncture it is important to remember that
enjoyment of rights for anyone may also subject to their
limitation provided this is lawful, necessary, proportionate
and non-discriminatory.
Strong concerns have been expressed about giving such
priority to the will and preferences of persons with mental
disabilities. Fears have been expressed that if the CRPD
Committee’s approach is followed it will allow for no intervention
whatsoever and may result in individuals being left without vital
support and at risk of harm or likely to cause harm to others
(4, 23). However, this is to misunderstand the intention behind
the CRPD message. The use of supported decision-making and
absence of, as previously mentioned, potentially discriminatory
mental capacity assessments leading to substituting the judgment
of others in the individual’s “best interests” allows for the
individual’s views to be given effect to the extent only that this
would occur with others. Where meaningful communication
is genuinely impossible the CRPD Committee recognizes that
supported decision-making does encompass the ability for others
to make a non-discriminatory best interpretation of the person’s
will and preferences (1). This interpretation will be something
which is very different to a “best interests” decision and would be
based on information gathered from those know to the individual
and taking into account the person’s values and beliefs and past
expressions of will and preferences (3, 24, 25). Whilst there is
inevitably some debate about whether this in effect amounts
to substitute decision-making but by another name (3, 26–
28), this does potentially allow for decisions to be made in
many challenging situations. Moreover, if a person with mental
disability therefore presents a risk of harm to themselves or to
others then they would be treated in exactly the same way as
persons without such a disability. This might involve steps being
taken under civil or criminal law. In crisis situations it might
also include taking steps to provide a “breathing” or safe space
in which to address the causes of a person’s mental distress and
to ascertain their genuine will and preferences. This to some
extent should ameliorate anxieties around having to give effect
to an individual’s wishes expressed in times of acute emergency
(29) although it is conceded that national civil and criminal
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justice environments will have to adapt to be conducive to such
an approach.
With this template in mind the possibilities supported
decision-making and current supported decision-making
framework in Scotland will now be considered.
SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING
POSSIBILITIES: THE NATURE AND TYPES
OF CRPD SUPPORTED
DECISION-MAKING
Having established that the objective of CRPD supported
decision-making is to ensure that an individual’s will and
preferences are given effect to the same extent as those of others
in all situations. Leaving aside for the time being the debate over
whether or not this can be achieved within substitute decision-
making frameworks, it is worth considering how the CRPD
Committee’s visualizes supported decision-making.
The CRPD itself7 does not state what form such support
should take but General Comment No.18 provides a clearer
indication of this albeit in broad terms. Important elements of
support are specified as encompassing “both informal and formal
support arrangements, of varying types and intensity.” and may,
for example, include one or more trusted support persons,
peer support, advocacy (including self-advocacy support), or
assistance with communication, measures relating to universal
design and accessibility (involving the state and private
individuals or bodies), the provision of information in an
understandable format, professional sign language interpretation
as well as recognizing diverse, non-conventional methods of
communication (especially non-verbal forms of communication)
and advance planning.
In contrast to the relatively scant information about the other
forms of potential supported decision-making General Comment
No. 19 actually says rather more about advance planning. It states
that “the ability to plan in advance is an important form of
support, whereby [they] can state their will and preferences which
should be followed at a time when they may not be in a position
to communicate their wishes to others.” It emphasizes the need
for equality of opportunity engage in advance planning which
might take various forms and that, where desired, support should
be provided to assist a person complete the advance planning
process. Finally, it directs that the person making an “advance
directive,” and no one else, must decide point at which it enters in
force (or ceases to have effect). Moreover, it should not come into
effect when a person is assessed as lacking mental capacity. This
last requirement tends to be at odds with common conceptions
of advance statements or directives the operation of which does
indeed tend to hinge on mental incapacity assessments.
7Articles 12(3) and (4) CRPD.
8Paras 17, 18, and 29, General Comment No. 1.




Laws are only one component of giving effect to international
human rights standards and resourcing and institutional and
societal policies, practices and culture are also essential (15, 30).
However, what laws contain and direct are a strong indication of
state and societal commitment to human rights adherence (15).
Scotland’s laws and practices are currently at a crossroads
in terms of support, care and interventions for persons with
mental disabilities. It is a devolved region of the United Kingdom
(UK) which has incorporated the largely civil and political
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) rights into its
legal framework through the Human Rights Act 1998. Scotland’s
devolved public bodies and courts must therefore interpret the
law and act in accordance with respect for individuals’ ECHR
rights, and individuals can enforce the rights through national
courts and tribunals.10 At devolved region level it’s legislation and
ministerial policy must be ECHR compatible or can be declared
unlawful and unenforceable.11
At the same time, respecting the UK’s international law
commitments, any devolved Scottish legislation or policy that
places the UK in breach of such obligationsmay also be prevented
by the UK Government.12 Adherence to the CRPD obviously
falls within these international obligations. Unlike the ECHR,
the CRPD is not incorporated into UK law which means that
it is influential but its rights are not directly legally enforceable
within Scotland. That being said, some indirect CRPD influence
can be discerned in terms of the Scottish and wider UK courts not
contravening international law unless there is national legislation
to the contrary and through any influence the CRPD has on
European Court of Human Rights rulings which the UK must
follow. Additionally, in Scotland there is already an appetite for
at least partial CRPD compliance. Supported decision-making
has figured in its current Mental Health Strategy 2017–2027 (31)
and in the recent Scottish Government review of the Adults with
Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000. Its influence was central to the
recently completed Independent Review of Learning Disability
and Autism in the Mental Health Act (32) and, as already
mentioned, is a driving force for the current Scottish Mental
Health Law Review.
At the time the Scottish Parliament enacted its current
mental health and capacity law, the Mental Health (Care and
Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 (Mental Health Act) and Adults
with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 (Adults with Incapacity Act)
ECHR compliance was a human rights priority in Scotland.
The principles that underpin the implementation of both Acts
were therefore strongly ECHR informed. However, the UK
subsequently ratified the CRPD which, along with developments
10Sections 2, 3, and 6 Human Rights Act 1998.
11Sections 29(2)(d) and 57(2) Scotland Act 1998. This differs from England where
ECHR incompatible laws can only be formally declared incompatible but remain
enforceable until amendment or repeal by the UK Parliament (section 4 Human
Rights Act 1998).
12Sections 35(1)(a) and 58(1) Scotland Act 1998.
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in ECHR jurisprudence, added an entirely new dimension to this
area of law and practice.
The principles that underpin implementation of both Acts
were designed to limit any non-consensual interventions relating
to persons with mental disabilities so that they are lawfully
authorized, proportionate, the least restrictive alternative and
provide a benefit not otherwise attainable.13 Moreover, relevant
to the issue of respect for an individual’s rights, will and
preferences, regard must be had for the person’s present and past
ascertainable wishes and feelings even where a person has been
deemed to lack decision-making capacity.14 The Mental Health
Act also emphasizes the need for patients to participate in care
and treatment decisions and to be appropriately supported to do
this.15 The Adults with Incapacity Act requires those responsible
for implementing interventions—including guardians, attorneys
and institutional managers—to encourage the exercise and
development of the adult’s skills relating to their welfare, finances
and property.16 However, neither Act is particularly clear about
how this support should ascertain a person’s wishes and feelings
or who bearers ultimate responsibility for this (3) and their
respective Codes of Practice do not add much to this and
mainly refer to only assisting communication (3). Nor does this
principle currently carry any greater weight than any of the
other principles. That being said, both Acts did take forward
recommendations in reports which prompted their enactment
that the individual’s voice be heard and respected in all decisions
made concerning them and that “best interests” assessments,
owing to their paternalistic connotations, be omitted from the
legislation (33, 34). Moreover, advance planning (in the form
of psychiatric advance statements and powers of attorney) and
advocacy, both of which are referred to in General Comment
No 1, are explicitly mentioned in Scottish mental health and
capacity law.
Advance Planning and Advocacy in
Scottish Mental Health and Capacity
Legislation
Advance Planning: Psychiatric Advance Statements
TheMental Health Act refers to psychiatric advance statements17
which allow patients to specify the ways in which they do and
do not wish to be treated for their mental disorder should
they subsequently lose capacity. The “capacity test” under this
legislation is that the patient has significantly impaired decision-
making ability because of the mental disorder such decisions
pertaining only to care and treatment for the mental disorder.18
The Mental Health Tribunal for Scotland and clinicians must
have regard to these wishes but can override them provided the
13Sections 1(3)(e) - (h) and 1(4), 36(5), 44(4), and 64(5) Mental Health Act;
Sections 1(2)-(3) Adults with Incapacity Act.
14Section 1(3)(a) Mental Health Act; Section 1(4)(a) Adults with Incapacity Act.
15Sections 1(3)(c)-(d) Mental Health Act.
16Section 1(5) Adults with Incapacity Act.
17Sections 275-276C Mental Health Act. Unlike in England, advance statements
relating to physical health are not statutorily recognized in Scotland although it
is considered that they would be accepted as valid, and thus effect given to them,
under the common law (30).
18Sections 36(4)(b), 44(4)(b), and 64(5)(d) Mental Health Act.
Act’s aforementioned principles, reinforced by those relating to
compulsion,19 are adhered to and the reasons for the override
are recorded.
International studies indicate that advance statements are
often seen as an important component in promoting human
rights-based approaches in healthcare (35). There is evidence that
psychiatric advance statements improve outcomes in terms of
experience of crises, taking medication, reduced coercion, and
human rights respect (36–40) even though generally uptake is
relatively low (41).
The low uptake of psychiatric statements is mirrored in
Scotland (42) despite amendments to the Mental Health Act
being introduced in 2015 to encourage the making of advance
statements by requiring health boards, overseen by the Mental
Welfare Commission for Scotland, to record the existence (and
withdrawal) of advance statements and publicize any support
they offer to patients to make or withdraw such statements.20
They also share many issues that more widely present problems
for the CRPD Committee. This is firstly seen in their reliance on
mental capacity to make them and incapacity to come into effect
and binary nature. This effectively locks patients, once capacity
is deemed to have been lost, into decisions made some time
ago which may no longer be representative of their current will
and preferences. This sits uncomfortably with the Committee’s
rejection of diagnostic and capacity thresholds although it has
alternatively been argued that to deny the ability to enter
into such arrangements may actually prevent a patient from
expressing their autonomous wishes in crises (43). Secondly,
the CRPD seeks to ensure active support for equal rights
enjoyment rather than define the perimeters for non-consensual
intervention but it is not entirely clear whether this is currently
always the motivation behind making advance statements in
Scotland. Of course, decisions to override preferences expressed
in an advance statement can be challenged by patients on human
rights grounds (44). However, as already mentioned, as the
current legal framework in Scotland currently gives precedence
to ECHR rights and ECHR jurisprudence continues to favor
the emphasis on defining limits for intervention approach. For
the time being advance statements are therefore likely to be
interpreted in accordance with this.
Advance Planning: Powers of Attorney
Another recognized form of advance planning can be found in
the making and use of financial and welfare powers of attorney
which is regulated by the Adults with Incapacity Act.21 These
allow individuals to both specify the actions they would like to
be taken regarding their finances, property, and welfare should
they lose capacity—on in the case of financial powers of attorney,
if the individual so wishes, whilst they retain capacity—and also
to nominate who they would like to exercise these powers on
their behalf. Although there are a few areas where it is unclear
whether or not the granter can empower the attorney to act on
19Sections 36(5), 44(4), and 64(5) Mental Health Act.
20Sections 276A−276C Mental Health Act (inserted by section 21 Mental Health
(Scotland) Act 2015).
21Sections 15–24 Adults with Incapacity Act.
Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 5 January 2021 | Volume 11 | Article 571005
Stavert Supported Decision-Making and Paradigm Shifts
their behalf (45) it is evident from the legislation, and reinforced
in its Code of Practice and related professional guidance, that
giving expression to the adult’s genuine wishes and feelings—
which allows for specifying how their incapacity triggering the
powers is assessed—is of primary importance (46, 47).22
Powers of attorney thus allow for a great deal of autonomy and
control for the granter, arguablymore so than psychiatric advance
statements. Moreover, attorneys are obliged by the Adults with
Incapacity to have regard to the Act’s principles when exercising
their powers which includes respect for the adult’s wishes and
feelings and supporting and encouraging their skills. However,
with the exception of some financial powers of attorney, in CRPD
terms they are ultimately subject to the same issues concerning
reliance of mental capacity assessments and their binary nature
as psychiatric advance statements.
Independent Advocacy
Although there is no general right to advocacy across Scotland
the Mental Health Act does confer a right to access to
independent advocacy to any person who has a mental disorder
together with a corresponding duty on local authorities and
health boards to ensure this.23 This applies whether or not the
person is subject to compulsion under the Act. In Scotland,
independent advocacy is viewed as a means by which individuals
with mental disorder can be supported to have control over their
lives through making their own decisions and expressing their
wishes (48–50). Both this and the absence of mental capacity
assessments activating the right to independent advocacy brings
the provision very close to the CRPD requirements for supported
decision-making albeit that a diagnosis of mental disorder is
still required to access it. Attempts were made in 2015 to
reinforce the provision by amending the Mental Health Act to
require local authorities and health boards to account to the
MentalWelfare Commission for their mental health independent
advocacy provision.24 The reality, however, is that despite
increasing demand for advocacy it is under-resourced with
gaps in provision. Providers are therefore forced to strategically
allocate their resources mainly to patients subject to psychiatric
compulsion (51, 52).
Mental Welfare Commission Guidance
“Soft” Supported Decision-Making
The recognition in legislation of relevant principles and
supported decision-making frameworks or arrangements clearly
adds weight to, and assists in driving forward, support for
the exercise of legal capacity but, of course, such support may
also be available outside legislation. For example, following an
information gathering exercise, the Mental Welfare Commission
for Scotland issued guidance in 2016 on supported decision-
making (53) in which it identified several non-legislative (“soft”)
forms of supported decision-making currently applicable to
Scotland in addition to those that are referred to in the Mental
Health Act and Adults with Incapacity Act.
22Sections 15(3)(c)(iii) and 16(3)(c)(iii) Adults with Incapacity Act.
23Section 259 Mental Health Act.
24Section 259A Mental Health Act [inserted by section 27 Mental Health
(Scotland) Act 2015].
These “soft” forms of supported decision-making include
trusted persons (which could include professionals, friends, or
families), peer support, advocacy, community and neighborhood
support, assistance with, and clear, communication,
technological support, and forms of advance planning beyond
advance statements and powers of attorney [for example,
anticipatory care planning, personal statements and specific
decisions about particular types of medical treatment such as
DNACPR (Do Not Resuscitate)].
Operational Requirements for Supported
Decision-Making
The guidance also sets out the operational requirements
for effective supported decision-making. This includes the
presumption of capacity and functional decision-making
assessments to determine point of access to, and type/nature of,
supported decision-making, adherence to legislative principles
and human rights standards, appropriate time for delivering
the support and ensuring no undue influence and conflict of
interest. It also highlights the benefits and issues concerning
family involvement in terms of ensuring the authenticity of
the individual’s will and preferences, the fact that the choice of
support should be that of individual, clarity as to the provider
of the support, honesty, communication and clarity around the
options for support and decisions to be made, positive risk taking
and record keeping.
Guidance Challenges
The aim of the guidance was to give better effect to existing
legislative provision and move toward Article 12 CRPD
compliance (53). It seeks to achieve this by reminding, instructing
and assisting those responsible for the care, treatment and
support of persons with mental disabilities of the importance
of actively supporting the individual to exercising their legal
capacity through ensuring their voice is heard. However, it
is evident that the guidance arguably faced the same CRPD
compliance challenges that are being more widely experienced in
law and practice reform.
Whilst the purpose of the guidance was to try to prevent
unnecessary, or at least delay, non-consensual interventions and
guarantee the individual’s voice the guidance is working within
and alongside a substitute decision-making regime. Although the
human rights-based legislative principles promote enlightened
approaches there are still no absolute guarantees that there will
be a presumption in favor of the individual’s will and preferences.
Moreover, whilst the legislation does not allow for best interests
decisions there are indications that these nevertheless do occur
in both practice and, sometimes, judicial decisions (54). All
the guidance can therefore realistically do is to reinforce the
fact that the legislative provisions designed to protect individual
autonomy are proactively and expansively given effect.
Human Rights-Based Approaches: But,
Which One?!
The differing approaches of the CRPD and earlier human
rights treaties, such as the ECHR, has already been alluded
to. This can cause dilemmas given that the incorporation of
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the ECHR in the UK and Scottish legal frameworks affords
its rights greater legal weight than CRPD rights although the
CRPD is influential, as mentioned, in Scotland. Indeed, any states
which are parties to both the ECHR and CRPD will encounter
similar challenges. ECHR jurisprudence has been at pains to
emphasize that persons with mental disability have the right to
the same level of rights guarantees and safeguards as others. It
has, for example, reinforced the functional capacity assessment
requirement as opposed to blanket assumptions of mental
capacity, the views of a person who has lost mental capacity
must not be discounted and proportionality and last resort
actions in relation to non-consensual interventions impacting
on an individual’s liberty and other aspect of their autonomy.25
Article 12 CRPD may arguably influence the European Court
of Human Rights’ interpretation of this, although at present
there is little evidence of this occurring to any sizeable degree.26
However, the ECHR does seem comfortable with the fact
that, despite the safeguards, it might on occasion be necessary
and acceptable to justify the restriction of a person’s liberty
and autonomy on the basis of diagnosis of mental disability
or related impairment, including loss of mental capacity.27
This obviously potentially prevents that person from enjoying
their right to exercise their legal capacity on an equal basis
with others which is arguably contrary to the CRPD. That
being said, if one adopts the CRPD and CRPD Committee
interpretation of equality of rights enjoyment, as outlined earlier,
then it might be possible to achieve greater synergy between
the two treaties even within the perimeters of mental health
and capacity legislation. The focus would be on supporting
decision-making, making “best interpretations” where absolutely
necessary and only adopting non-consensual interventions
where this would be the case for others without a diagnosis of
mental disability or mental incapacity assessment. As previously
stated, this would lend itself more readily to even difficult
cases. However, admittedly more research would be required to
ascertain how this might be practically implemented, including
the effectiveness and efficacy of different forms of support
for decision-making.
CONCLUSION: THE WAY FORWARD?
It is clear that attempts have been made to support autonomy,
through legislative principles and recognition of psychiatric
advance statements, powers of attorney and independent
advocacy provision, in Scottish legislation. It is also clear that
other “soft” supported decision-making mechanisms also exit
alongside side which operate in practice. However, the fact
remains that respect for the individual’s views must currently
compete with other principles, practices and societal and
25Winterwerp v Netherlands (1979-80) 2 EHRR 387; Shtukaturov v Russia (App no
44009/05) (2012) 54 EHRR 27; Sykora v Czech Republic (App no 23419/07) (2012)
ECHR 1960; Stanev v Bulgaria (2012) 55 EHRR 22; DD v Lithuania (2012) ECHR
254; A-MV v Finland (App no 53251/13) ECtHR, 23 March 2017.
26See, for example, A-MV v Finland (ibid).
27Winterwerp v Netherlands (op cit).
institutional cultures that might be more favorable to non-
consensual intervention which are linked to diagnosis and
mental capacity assessments and, despite legislative direction
to the contrary, best interest decisions. The current legal
framework in Scotland can probably be most accurately
described as adhering to an enlightened medical model. It
seeks to maintain and enhance individual autonomy and rights
but focuses on protecting those with mental disabilities (and,
where necessary, others), but not necessarily their rights, and
accepts the potential inevitability of restriction and seeks to
define the limits to it. At present, it provides no absolute
guarantees in terms of the necessary ingredients to achieve
the CRPD interpretation of equality in the exercise of legal
capacity. Such ingredients would require support timeously
provided at the point of need (which may be required
long before considering non-consensual intervention, during
and following such intervention) and decisions to restrict a
person’s autonomy of which are premised on assumptions about
capabilities and risk associated with diagnosis or mental capacity.
Evidence for elsewhere indicates that even autonomy enhancing
arrangements such as the “good man” system in Sweden where
only limited possibility exists to substitute another’s views for
those of a person with mental disability will not meet CRPD
requirements (55).
There is an appetite within Scotland to move toward a more
CRPD compliant legal framework. The influence of the CRPD
in relation to the recent reviews relating to the Adults with
Incapacity Act and Learning Disability and Autism in the Mental
Health Act have already been mentioned. In addition, in 2016
the Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland and Center for
Mental Health and Capacity Law (Edinburgh Napier University)
conducted a law reform scoping exercise against an ECHR
and CRPD template. In the resultant 2017 report Scotland’s
Mental Health and Capacity Law: the Case for Reform (56)
made several recommendations which included that Scottish
mental health and capacity law required revisiting, with the active
involvement of persons with lived experience (reflecting Article
4(3) CRPD requirements) to ensure it was continuing to meet
international human rights standards, notably the ECHR and
CRPD. Amongst other things, it noted that the current diagnostic
and capacity thresholds in the legislation were problematic in
terms of achieving a non-discrimination approach to the care,
treatment and support of persons with mental disability. It
also recommended that more needed to be done to maximize
the autonomy and agency of people with “mental disorder”28
as well as consideration of what “respect for rights, will and
preferences” actually means. It is perhaps worth noting in
this context that other Mental Welfare Commission research
has reported that many of the persons with lived experience
consulted had indicated that levels of autonomy desired by
individuals in relation to care and treatment will vary according
to the situation (57).
28The term “mental disorder” is used in both the Mental Health Act and Adults
with Incapacity Act. Section 328 of the Mental Health Act defines “mental
disorder” as meaning mental illness, personality disorder.
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The Case for Reform, together with calls from stakeholders
(included lived experience), persuaded the Scottish Government
sufficiently that it should establish the previously mentioned
Scottish Mental Health Law Review. The Review is seeking
to address, amongst other things, the challenging questions
posed by the CRPD and General Comment No 1 and the
CRPD’s interpretation of the right to liberty in Article 14
(58). This includes consideration of what equality and non-
discrimination in relation to rights enjoyment looks like in
the context of non-consensual psychiatric and other measures.
The quality and reliability of mental capacity assessments and
efficacy of such assessments as the threshold to non-interventions
together with the scope of supported decision-making will
also being investigated. Moreover, in terms of achieving CRPD
transformation, issues such as actual and perceived levels of
risk and the ability of existing ordinary and forensic mental
health (and wider criminal justice) systems to adapt to the CRPD
“paradigm shift” will need to be explored.
If equal rights enjoyment underpinned by supported decision-
making is to be genuinely accessible for persons with mental
disabilities in Scotland, and thereby CRPD compliance achieved,
then fundamental legal and practice culture change will be
required (15). The extent to which it will be possible to achieve
this remains to be seen.
DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
All datasets generated for this study are included in the
article/supplementary material.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
The author confirms being the sole contributor of this work and
has approved it for publication.
FUNDING
This article originated in the context of the workshop Human
Rights and Mental Health, held at the Institute for Medical
Ethics and History of Medicine of the Ruhr University Bochum,
Germany, on April 1–5, 2019.
REFERENCES
1. Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. General Comment No 1
(2014) Article 12: Equal recognition before the law. CRPD/C/GC/1.
2. Martin W, Michalowski S, Jütten T, Burch M. Achieving CRPD Compliance.
(2014). Available online at: https://autonomy.essex.ac.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2017/01/EAP-Position-Paper-FINAL.pdf (accessed June 9, 2020).
3. Martin W, Michalowski S, Stavert J, Ward A, Ruck Keene A, Caughey
C, et al. Three Jurisdictions Report: Towards Compliance with CRPD
Art. 12 in Capacity/Incapacity Legislation across the UK. (2016). Available
online at: https://autonomy.essex.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/EAP-
3J-Final-Report-2016.pdf (accessed June 9, 2020).
4. Freeman MC, Kolaa K, Caldas de Almeida JM, Kleinmann A,
Makhashvili N, Phakathi S. Reversing hard won victories in the name
of human rights: a critique of the General Comment on Article 12
of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
Lancet Psychiatry. (2015) 9:844–50. doi: 10.1016/S2215-0366(15)
00218-7
5. UK Government. Modernising the Mental Health Act – final report from the
independent review. Department of Health and Social Care. (2018).
6. Zinkler M. Suorted decision making in the prevention of compulsory
interventions in mental health care. Front Psychiatry. (2019) 10:137.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyt.2019.00137
7. Zinkler M, von Peter S. End coercion in mental health services—toward a
system based on Suort only. Laws. (2019) 8:19. doi: 10.3390/laws8030019
8. Szmukler G. Involuntary detention and treatment: are we edging
toward a “paradigm shift?” Schizophrenia Bulletin. (2020) 5:sbz115.
doi: 10.1093/schbul/sbz115
9. Szmukler G, Daw R, Callard F. Mental health law and the UN Convention on
the rights of Persons with Disabilities. Int J Law Psychiatry. (2014) 37:245–52.
doi: 10.1016/j.ijlp.2013.11.024
10. Daws T. Obtaining consent for non-psychiatric treatment of
persons detained under mental health legislation in Australia
and New Zealand: is there cross-jurisdictional consistency?
Australasia Psychiatry. (2018) 26:486–90. doi: 10.1177/10398562187
97444
11. Ryan C, Callaghan S, Large M. Better laws for coercive psychiatric treatment:
lessons from the Waterlow case. Australasia Psychiatry. (2012) 20:283–6.
doi: 10.1177/1039856212449668
12. Bartlett P. Suorted Decision-Making in English legislation. Unterstützte
Entscheidungsfindung in der psychiatrischen Praxis. Psychiatrie
Verlag. (2019).
13. Minkowitz T. CRPD and transformative equality. Int J Law Context. (2017)
13:77–86. doi: 10.1017/S1744552316000483
14. Clough B. New legal landscapes: (re)constructing the boundaries
of mental capacity law. Medical Law Rev. (2018) 26:246–75.
doi: 10.1093/medlaw/fwy012
15. Stavert J. Paradigm shift or paradigm paralysis? National mental health and
capacity law and implementing the CRPD in Scotland. Laws. (2018) 7:26.
doi: 10.3390/laws7030026
16. Nilsson A. Objective and reasonable? scrutinising compulsory mental health
interventions from non-discrimination perspective. Human Rights Law Rev.
(2014) 14:459–85. doi: 10.1093/hrlr/ngu022
17. UNHuman Rights Committee.Gillot andOthers v France (932/2000). A/57/40
at 270 (2002), 15 July 2002; 10 IHRR 22 (2003). Geneva: UN Human Rights
Committee (2003).
18. UN Human Rights Committee. Guido Jacobs v Belgium (943/2000).
CCPR/C/81/D/943/2000. Geneva: UN Human Rights Committee (2000).
19. UN Committee on Economic. Social and Cultural Rights: General Comment
20: Non-Discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Art. 2).
E/C.12/GC/20, 2 July 2009; 16 IHRR 925 (2009). Geneva: UN Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) (2009).
20. Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. General Comment
No. 6 (2018) on Equality and Non-Discrimination. CRPD/C/GC/6.
Geneva: UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
CRPD/C/GC/6 (2018).
21. Sen A. Human rights and capabilities. J Human Dev. (2005) 6:51–66.
doi: 10.1080/14649880500120491
22. Venkatapuram S. Health Justice—An Argument from the Capabilities Aroach.
Cambridge: Polity Press (2011).
23. UK Government. Modernising the Mental Health Act: Final Report from the
Independent Review. GOV.UK (2018).
24. Gooding P. Navigating the ‘flashing amber lights’ of the right to legal capacity
in the united nations convention on the rights of persons with disabilities:
responding to major concerns. Human Rights Law Rev. (2015) 15:45–71.
doi: 10.1093/hrlr/ngu045
25. Flynn E, Arstein-Kerslake A. The support model of legal capacity: fact, fiction,
or fantasy? Berkeley J Int Law. (2014) 32:134–53. doi: 10.15779/Z38494G
Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 8 January 2021 | Volume 11 | Article 571005
Stavert Supported Decision-Making and Paradigm Shifts
26. Booth-Glen K. Changing paradigms: mental capacity, legal capacity,
guardianship, and beyond. Columbia Human Rights Law Rev. (2012)
44:93–169.
27. Series L. Relationships, autonomy and legal capacity: mental
capacity and suort paradigms. Int J Law Psychiatry. (2015) 40:80–91.
doi: 10.1016/j.ijlp.2015.04.010
28. Quinn G. Personhood and Legal Capacity Perspectives of the Paradigm
Shift of Article 12 CRPD (Concept Paper) HPOD Conference. Harvard Law
School (2010).
29. Flynn E, Arstein-Kerslake A. State intervention in the lives of people with
disabilities: the case for a disability-neutral framework. Int J Law Context.
(2017) 13:39–57. doi: 10.1017/S1744552316000495
30. De Sabbata K, Syuria E. Suorted Decision-Making and Dementia. M Zinckler
et al. Unterstützte Entscheidungsfindung in der psychiatrischen Praxis:
Psychiatrie Verlag. (2019).
31. Scottish Government. Mental Health Strategy 2017–2027. (2017). Available
online at: https://www.gov.scot/publications/mental-health-strategy-2017-
2027 (accessed June 9, 2020).
32. The Independent Review of Learning Disability and Autism in the
Mental Health Act. Final Report. (2019). https://www.irmha.scot/wp-content/
uploads/2020/01/IRMHA-Final-report-18-12-19-2.pdf (accessed June 9,
2020).
33. Scottish Executive. New Directions: Report on the Review of the Mental
Health (Scotland) Act 1984. (2001). SE/2001/56. Available online at: https://
www.mhtscotland.gov.uk/mhts/files/Millan_Report_New_Directions.pdf
(accessed June 9, 2020).
34. Scottish Law Commission. Report on Incapable Adults. (1995). Scot Law
Com. 151. Available online at: https://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/files/5013/
2758/0994/rep151_1.pdf (accessed June 9, 2020).
35. Weller P. New Law and Ethics in Mental Health Advance Directives: The
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Right to Choose.
Abingdon: Routledge (2012). doi: 10.4324/9780203079300
36. Swanson JW,Marvin S, Swartz EB, Elbogen RA, Van Dorn H,Wagner R, et al.
Psychiatric advance directives and reduction of coercive crisis interventions. J
Mental Health. (2008) 17:255–67. doi: 10.1080/09638230802052195
37. Morrissey F. Advance Directives in Mental Health Care: Hearing the Voice of
the Mentally Ill. (2010). Available online at: https://aran.library.nuigalway.ie/
handle/10379/1146 (accessed June 9, 2020).
38. Weller P. Psychiatric advance directives and human rights. Psychiatry Psychol
Law. (2010) 17:218–29. doi: 10.1080/13218710903496318
39. Wilder CM, Elbogen EB, Moser LL, Swanson JW, Swartz MS. Medication
preferences and adherence among individuals with severe mental illness
and psychiatric advance directives. Psychiatric Services. (2010) 61:380–5.
doi: 10.1176/ps.2010.61.4.380
40. Ruchlewska A, Kamperman AM, Wierdsma AI, van der Gaag M, Mulder CL.
Determinants of completion and use of psychiatric advance statements in
mental health care in the Netherlands. Psychiatric Services. (2016) 67:858–63.
doi: 10.1176/appi.ps.201400495
41. Maylea C, Jorgensen A, Matta S, Ogilvie K, Wallin P. Consumers’
experiences of mental health advance statements. Laws. (2018) 7:22.
doi: 10.3390/laws7020022
42. Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland. Mental Health Act Monitoring
Report 2018–2019. Edinburgh. Available online at: https://www.mwcscot.
org.uk/sites/default/files/2019-10/MHA-MonitoringReport-2019_0.pdf
(accessed June 9, 2020).
43. Scholten M, Gieselmann A, Gather J, Vollmann J. Psychiatric advance
directives under the convention on the rights of persons with disabilities: why
advance instructions should be able to override current preferences. Front
Psychiatry. (2019) 10:631. doi: 10.3389/fpsyt.2019.00631
44. Stavert J. Added value: using human rights to suort psychiatric advance
statements. Edinburgh Law Rev. (2013) 17:210–23. doi: 10.3366/elr.2013.
0155
45. Stavert J. The exercise of legal capacity, suorted decision- making
and Scotland’s Mental Health and Incapacity Legislation: working
with CRPD challenges. Laws. (2015) 4:296–313. doi: 10.3390/laws40
20296
46. Scottish Government. Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000. Code
of Practice for Continuing and Welfare Attorneys. (2011). Available online
at: http://www.gov.scot/Resource/Doc/347702/0115819.pdf
47. Law Society of Scotland. Vulnerable Client Guidance. Edinburgh: Law Society
of Scotland (2013).
48. Scottish Government. Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act
2003 - Code of Practice. Edinburgh (2005).
49. Scottish Independent Advocacy Alliance. Independent Advocacy Principles,
Standards & Code of Best Practice. (2019). Available online at: https://www.
siaa.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/SIAA-Principles-Final-2nd-print-
run-with-ISBN.pdf (accessed June 9, 2020).
50. Scottish Government. Independent Advocacy—Guide for Commissioners.
Edinburgh: Scottish Government (2013). Available online at: https://
www.gov.scot/publications/independent-advocacy-guide-commissioners/
(accessed June 9, 2020).
51. The Scottish Independent Advocacy Alliance. A Map of Advocacy across
Scotland 2015–2016 edition. (2016). Available online at: https://www.siaa.
org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/SIAA_Advocacy_Map_2015-16-1.pdf
(accessed June 9, 2020).
52. Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland. The Right to Advocacy. (2018).
Available online at: https://www.mwcscot.org.uk/sites/default/files/2019-06/
the_right_to_advocacy_march_2018.pdf (accessed June 9, 2020).
53. Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland. Suorted Decision-Making. (2016).
Available online at: https://www.mwcscot.org.uk/sites/default/files/2019-06/
mwc_sdm_draft_gp_guide_10__post_board__jw_final.pdf (accessed June 9,
2020).
54. Ruck Keene A, Ward A. With and without ‘best interests’- the Mental
Capacity Act 2005, the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 and
Constructing Decisions. Int J Mental Health Capacity Law. (2016) 22:17–31.
doi: 10.19164/ijmhcl.v2016i22.549
55. Montoya TF. Supported Decision-Making in Swedish Law – Is the “Good
Man” a Good or Bad Guy in Light of the CRPD? In: M Zinckler, et al., editors.
Unterstützte Entscheidungsfindung in der psychiatrischen Praxis: Psychiatrie
Verlag (2019). p. 222–32.
56. McKay C, Stavert J. Scotland’s Mental Health and Capacity Law: the Case
for Reform. Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland/Edinburgh Napier
University (2017) 222–232. Available online at: https://www.mwcscot.org.uk/
sites/default/files/2019-06/scotland_s_mental_health_and_capacity_law.pdf
(accessed June 9, 2020).
57. Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland. The views of people
with lived experience on How much we want to keep our
autonomy when being cared for, July. (2019). Available online
at: https://www.mwcscot.org.uk/sites/default/files/2019-07/20181203_
HowMuchWeWantToKeepOurAutonomyWhenBeingCaredFor_0.pdf
(accessed June 9, 2020).
58. Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Guidelines on Article14
of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: the Right to
Liberty and Security of Persons with Disabilities. (2015) Available online
at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.
aspx?symbolno$=$A/72/55&Lang=en (accessed June 9, 2020).
Conflict of Interest: The author declares that the research was conducted in the
absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a
potential conflict of interest. The author is a member of the Executive Team of the
Scottish Mental Health Law Review. However, the views expressed in this article
are those of the author alone and not of the Executive Team.
The handling editor declared a past collaboration with the author.
Copyright © 2021 Stavert. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or
reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the
copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal
is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or
reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 9 January 2021 | Volume 11 | Article 571005
